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Abstract 
The objective in this paper is to highlight the complex linkages of capital input to potential output 
in the U.S. nonfarm private business sector. For this purpose the analytical framework used by 
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) is adapted and re-estimated using data from the U.S. Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) over the period 
1949-2016. By focusing on the changes in the composition of the capital stock in terms of struc-
tures, equipment and intangibles, average service lives, and the relative prices of producer’s to 
consumer’s goods, the paper allows for their influence on the capital input and traces the latter’s 
effects on the potential output. It is found that: (a) when the capital input is adjusted to reflect all 
aforementioned changes, the potential output decelerated in recent decades even faster than sug-
gested by CBO’s estimates; (b) in the post-2007 period the shortfall in the estimated potential 
output widened relative to that computed by CBO, and (c) the faster deceleration of the potential 
output emanated from the declining share of structures in the capital stock and the spectacular 
decline in the prices of equipment relative to structures. Drawing on these findings it is concluded 
that, although the real economy may have overshoot its potential in the last few years, the forces 
that slow down potential output through changes in the capital input remain intact and, unless 
some remedial policies are instituted, they will continue to function as significant headwinds to 
U.S. economic growth, along with all others that are well known. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis that unfolded in U.S. in the years 2007-2008 was accompanied by a recession-
recovery cycle much different than those in the preceding decades. In particular, the recession that 
followed in 2009 was steeper and lasted a longer; despite the fairly quick pace of return to full em-
ployment, the expansion of output was sluggish and after eight years continued to remain signifi-
cantly below the rolling forecasts of the potential output; inflation showed hardly any signs of ac-
celeration; and the central bank policy rate was stuck for several years in the vicinity of the zero 
bound. Reflecting on these developments, Summers (2013a, 2013b, 2014a) invoked Hansen’s 
(1934) conceptualizations to advance the hypothesis that the U.S. had entered into a period of secu-
lar stagnation by which he meant that full employment output with price stability could not be ex-
pected to grow in the coming years by more than a modest percentage per annum.  
At the time, he and others conjectured that the actual output did not converge to its potential 
because of insufficient aggregate demand. But as this deficiency could not explain the substantial 
decline in the economy’s productive capacity relative to its pre-2007 trend, Summers (2014b) 
moved in the direction of Gordon (2012, 2014a) by expanding on the latter’s headwinds that hold 
back potential output. Thus, according to the analyses by these scholars, secular stagnation in the 
U.S. is propagated by:  
 The drag of past economic weaknesses on potential output, i.e. hysteresis;  
 The deteriorating demographics due to the ageing of the population;  
 The leveling off of the trend towards increased women’s participation in the labor force; 
 The exhaustion of the gains from an increasingly educated workforce; 
 The widening of inequality in the distribution of income;  
 The interaction between globalization and information technology and communications;  
 The worsening balance in the fronts of energy and the environment, and 
 The burgeoning ratio of public and private Debt to Gross National Product.  
Observe that absent from this list are factors that may affect the supply of output through the 
economy’s capital stock. Therefore it is worth asking: Aren’t there capital related issues that are 
too significant to ignore? There are because, for example, unlike the ageing of the population, 
about which very little can be done to slow down its progress, if potential output decelerates due 
to capital stock growing older, it may be possible by designing and implementing appropriate 
counterbalancing policies to stem or even reverse its degradation, and hence forestall the erosion 
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of its contribution to economic growth. 
The lack of attention to the capital input is puzzling for yet another reason. According to 
Jorgenson (1991), over the years 1948-1985 aggregate value added in the U.S. grew on the aver-
age 3.28 % per annum. To this growth rate the capital input contributed 1.46 percentage points, 
of which 0.88 emanated from changes in the quality of capital and 0.58 from changes in the capi-
tal stock; technological change accounted for another 0.71 percentage points, and the number of 
hours worked and the quality of labor for 0.73 and 0.39, respectively.
1
 More recently, 
Wasshausen et al. (2016) computed the sources of U.S. growth for the period 1998-2012 and 
found that the aggregate value added increased 1.94% per annum and that the capital input con-
tributed 1.13 percentage points, technological change 0.38, and the labor input 1.11.
2
 From these 
and other studies, as well as the estimates shown in Table A5 in the Appendix, it follows that: (a) 
throughout the post war period the capital input has been a prime source of U.S. economic 
growth; (b) its contribution has been declining, and (c) the rate by which it carries into production 
new technologies is also slowing down since Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is declining. But in 
difference to the priorities that this evidence would suggest, research into the headwinds for eco-
nomic growth that may originate in the capital input has not received the emphasis it deserves.  
Moreover, in tackling the aforementioned question, the present paper draws on research that we 
conducted recently into the behavior of business investment in the U.S. over the post war period. 
More specifically, in Bitros, Nadiri (2017a) we found that reckoning the size of the undepreciated 
capital stock in terms of capital years yields a more accurate measure of the capital input, whereas 
from Bitros, Nadiri (2017b) we learned that changes in the composition of the capital stock render 
the rate of its replacement, and hence the potential level of its services, variable even over the busi-
ness cycle. Thus, the approach in this study is to adopt the model and the computational procedures 
that the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) employs to estimate the trend growth rate of potential 
output, but do so in conjunction with, first, a new index of capital input that allows for the shift in 
the composition of the capital stock away from structures and towards equipment and intellectual 
property products (henceforth referred as intangibles); second, the progressive ageing of the capital 
                                                     
1
 Several years earlier Fraumeni, Jorgenson (1980) conducted an equally exhaustive study of the sources of U.S. 
growth for the period 1948-1976. At the time they found that aggregate value added grew 3.50 % per annum; capi-
tal contributed 1.61 percentage points, technological change 1.14 and labor 0.75. 
2
 Aside from computing the sources of U.S. economic growth by following a bottom-up approach starting at the in-
dustry level, this study offers a detailed survey of the main methodological and implementation issues that bear on 
the differences in the measurement of the capital input.  
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stock since the 1980s, despite the aforementioned major compositional shift in favor of less durable 
physical assets; and thirdly, the long term decline in the relative prices of producers’ to consumers’ 
goods. Expectedly, introducing the revised index of capital input into the CBO model and solving 
for the trend growth rate in the potential output will enable gauging of the differences that result 
and assessing their magnitude and direction. The maintained hypothesis is that the observed slow-
down in the U.S of the potential output is not invariant with respect to the aforementioned shifts in 
the capital input.  
Section 2 presents the model by means of which CBO obtains past and future estimates of po-
tential output. Brief references to the data they use, the ways in which they adjust the inputs of 
labor and capital before introducing them into the model, and the most recent results they have 
reported are found in the same place.  Section 3 explains how CBO computes the index of the 
capital input, how the latter is adapted to allow for certain related aspects that they leave unac-
counted, and how the two indices compare. Then, Section 4 discusses the estimates of potential 
output when the revised index of the capital input is used in the CBO model. In these computa-
tions the series of the labor input is the same as that reported by CBO. Therefore, since the differ-
ences in the estimates of the potential output that emerge should be due to the differences in the 
two indices of the capital input, the section closes with their statistical analysis; Lastly, Section 5 
concludes with a summary of the findings and some thoughts about possible policy options.  
2. The CBO model of potential output  
In the CBO model Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is defined as the sum of five components. That 
is, GDP produced in the sectors of: private nonfarm business, government, farming, households and 
nonprofit institutions, and residential housing. Adding to these the gross foreign product, they ar-
rive at the definition of Gross National Product (GNP). Of all sectors by far the largest is the private 
nonfarm business, since for example in 2016 it accounted for 76.3% of GDP, compared with 11.9% 
of the government. Thus, to economize on research resources, but also because the objective here is 
mainly methodological, it is convenient to adopt the following delimitations:  
 Restrict attention only to the sector of private nonfarm business. 
 Ignore CBO’s estimation of rolling ten-year projections of potential output and focus sole-
ly on the historical part of the analysis. 
 Consider CBO’s cyclical adjustment of the labor input as given and concentrate on the in-
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put of capital services. 
 Limit the disaggregation of the capital input to three components, i.e., structures, equip-
ment and intellectual property products or intangibles. 
 Apply the “rental prices” of capital services as computed in Bitros, Nadiri (2017b). 
However, it is noted that narrowing the scope of the inquiry along the above lines involves losses 
neither in the generality of the arguments nor in the findings.  
According to the Congressional Budget Office (2001, 8-9), the method by which they estimate 
past and future growth rates of potential GDP is based on the Cobb-Douglas production function: 
1
1t t t tQ AL K
 
 ,                                                               (1) 
in which the symbols are defined as follows: tQ = real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in year t; 
tL = billion hours worked in year t; 1tK  = real value of the capital stock in year t-1; tA  = Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) in year t; and the parameter   stands for the income share of capital in 
the value of output.
3
  
Transforming (1) into logarithmic form, differentiating totally the resulting expression, and 
setting 0.3   on account of the evidence that the payments to owners of capital have averaged 
roughly 30 percent of total U.S. income since 1947, yields:  
10 7 0 3t t t t% Q % A . % L . % K         .                                         (2)  
This equation states that the growth rate of real GDP equals the growth rate of TFP plus the 
weighted average of the growth rates of labor and capital; Or, to express it in a way indicating 
that TFP is computed as a residual, the growth rate of tA  is equal to the growth rate of tQ  not ac-
counted for by the weighted average of the growth rates of  and t tL K .  
Equation (2) holds generally. That is, it holds for any period, any value of , and any dis-
aggregation, definition and measurement of the variables involved. Thus, by redefining it as:   
1% % 0.7 % 0.3 %
p p p p
t t t tQ A L K          ,                                               (3) 
                                                     
3
 It should be noted that the data we employ in this paper consist of annual observations for the nonfarm private busi-
ness sector of the U.S over the period 1949-2016. Hence, from now on we shall construe that index t stands for years. 
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where the upper index p denotes the “potential” values of the variables, CBO researchers proceed in 
two steps. In the first step, using (2) in conjunction with data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA), for the variables  and t tQ K , and from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), for the 
variable tL , they compute the growth rates of tA  going back to 1949. Naturally past values vary due 
to both regular and irregular factors. Therefore, to obtain the growth rates  %  and %
t t
p pL A  , the var-
iables tL  and tA  are purged from their cyclical components. As for the growth rate%
p
tK , this is ob-
tained by setting 1 1
p
t tK K    on account of the rationalization that: 
 “…, the capital input does not need to be cyclically adjusted to create a “poten-
tial” level—the unadjusted capital input already represents its potential contri-
bution to output. Although use of the capital stock varies greatly during the busi-
ness cycle, the potential flow of capital services will always be related to the to-
tal size of the capital stock, not to the amount currently being used.” 
Lastly, upon inserting 
1% , %  and %t t
p p p
tA L K     into (3), they obtain the trend growth rate 
% ptQ as a weighted sum of the trend growth rates of labor and capital services plus the trend 
growth rate in Total Factor Productivity (TFP).  
Table A1 in the Appendix
4
 reports the Gross Domestic Product ( tGDP ) as a measure of out-
put ( tQ ), the labor ( tL ) and capital ( 1tK  ) inputs, and labor productivity ( /t tQ L ). These consti-
tute the actual series reported in the sources mentioned at the bottom of the table. Table A2 re-
ports the most recent estimates and projections by CBO of potential output (
p
tQ ) and its deter-
minants. In the latter table the rows 1949-2016 refer to the historical estimates, whereas the 
rows 2017-2027 exhibit those that are projected. Finally, in line with the above remark that
1 1
p
t tK K  , the series of capital input reported by CBO is the same in both tables.  
3. Towards an improved measure of the capital input  
According to the Congressional Budget Office (2001, 17-20, 27-29), the capital input is estimated 
on the basis of an index which measures the proportionate growth rate of an aggregate asset ob-
tained as a weighted average of the proportionate growth rates of seven distinct assets. In particu-
lar, this takes the form of the Tornquist index: 
                                                     
4
 Note that all tables having an A in their numbering are located in the Appendix.  
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1 7
1 1 1 7 1
log( ) log( ) ... log( ).   t t t
t t t
K K K
K K K
 
  
                                           (4)  
The weights it  are defined as follows: 
1
7
1
          ( ) / 2
         s / ,  
it it it
it it it it it
i
s s
c K c K
 

 
 
                                                      (5) 
and itc stands for the rental price or “user cost” of asset i in year t. If the business firms in the non-
farm sector pay owners the value of the marginal product that their assets contribute and there are 
constant returns to scale in production, then its  denotes the share of each asset in total capital costs 
or in the total income received by the owners of assets. 
The computation of the capital assets entering into equation (4) is quite standard. From the 
Congressional Budget Office (2001, 28) it follows that of the seven assets included, the first five 
are computed by applying the well-known difference equation: 
1(1 )it i it itK K I    ,                                                       (6) 
where  itK  denotes the net stock of asset i in year t; 1itK   stands for the net stock of asset i lagged 
one year; itI  represents the investment in asset i in year t, and i  is the depreciation rate of asset i. 
Given a value for asset itK  at 0t   and the corresponding series of investment itI , solving equation 
(6) returns a proportional depreciation rate together with a series of the net capital stock for asset i, 
which is consistent with the series of investment. The assumption that underlies this conceptualiza-
tion is that the depreciation of asset i is geometric or, alternatively, that the decline in its efficiency 
in period t is equal to a constant percentage i  of its stock in year t-1. As for the remaining two as-
sets, i.e. nonfarm inventories and land, these are computed as fixed percentages of the real econom-
ic growth the former, and the investment in nonresidential structures the latter. 
  This paper departs from the above benchmark model in several ways. One differentiation has 
to do with the depreciation rate  . Following Bitros, Flytzanis (2007), the rate by which the 
quantity of services of an asset declines from one period to the other ought to be specified as a 
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function of economic forces like intensity of utilization, maintenance expenditures and techno-
logical obsolescence. Such a specification would escape from the strong assumption that the rate 
of depreciation is a function of the age of the asset in question. However, even though it would be 
recommended from a microeconomic point of view, venturing into such an undertaking here 
would take us far afield. So a compromise is in order. CBO’s specification in (6) follows Jorgen-
son’s (1963) approach by assuming that over its service life the asset loses efficiency geometri-
cally at the rate i . In Figure 1, the efficiency loses of this asset would follow the path shown  by 
the convex line labeled “geometric”. On the contrary, in its multifactor productivity studies the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) employs an age-efficiency profile like the one shown by 
aggregating over various assets whose depreciation follows the hyperbolic function in which the 
single parameter involved takes values from 0, for assets with straight line depreciation, to 1, for 
those that fall in the one hoss shay pattern.
5
 Thus, to simplify matters, but also because the 
straight line depreciation is nearer to the geometric used by CBO, a good approximation is to set:  
1
it
itL
   ,                                                                  (7) 
where itL denotes the service life of asset i in year t. Observe that, whereas under the geometric 
                                                     
5
 For a detailed explanation of the method by which BLS obtains the age-efficiency depreciation pattern shown in 
Figure 1, see U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (1983, 38-45). 
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pattern depreciation remains a constant proportion of the asset irrespective of its service life, un-
der the straight line scheme the depreciation rate increases as the service lives of assets decline. 
Hence, if the wear and tear and technological progress accelerate over time and reduce asset 
lives, as happened mostly in the postwar period, straight line depreciation may be better attuned 
with experience than the geometric. 
 A second differentiation is that nonfarm inventories and land are ignored and all other assets 
are grouped into structures, equipment, and intangibles. The main reasons for adopting this clas-
sification are that: (a) it coincides with the disaggregation in the data on “Fixed assets” that the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes as part of the National Income and Products 
Accounts (NIPA); (b) this source of data provides rich information on the average service lives of 
the aforementioned aggregate assets, so that expression (7) may be applied to calculate their de-
preciation rates,
6
 and (c)  having used these data in Bitros, Nadiri (2017a, b) to calculate the re-
spective rental prices provides extensive computational synergies.
7
 Recall though that CBO splits 
equipment into computers, communications equipment, and all other equipment. So it is likely 
that their measure of the capital input may reflect more accurately than ours the impact of rapid 
technological advances in the activities of information processing and transmission. This is an 
important aspect to keep in mind later on in the assessment of the comparative effects of the vari-
ous measures of the capital input introduced in the computations.  
After applying equations (4)-(7) to aggregate structures, equipment and intangibles into an 
overall capital stock, a differentiation is introduced in the measurement by CBO so as to allow 
for the three trends mentioned in the introduction. To begin with, Figure 2 shows that throughout 
the decades under consideration the share of structures declined, whereas those of equipment and 
intangibles increased. This transformation of the capital stock away from long lived producer’s 
goods and towards short  lived ones is rather unlikely to have left the contribution of the capital 
input to productivity, and hence to the growth rate of the economy, unaffected. Drawing on this 
presumption, an index based in 2009 is derived from the share of structures and used to compute 
                                                     
6
 More specifically, BEA’s NIPA database, Section 6, Table 5.10, reports the average service lives for structures, 
equipment and intangibles both at current and historical replacement prices. Based on our experience with these da-
ta in Bitros, Nadiri (2017a, b), in this paper we have decided to employ the series of service lives at historical re-
placement prices.  
7
 The report by the Congressional Budget Office (2001) does not contain any information about the method by which 
they compute the rental prices of the aggregated assets via equation (4).  It is likely that they apply the procedure 
described in the U.S, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1983, 49-51). But adopting the latter would involve computations 
that are too tedious and unnecessary for the test we pursue here. 
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what the capital stock would have been if its composition remained throughout similar to that in 
the base year. In other words, the index so constructed is employed to normalize the composition 
of the capital stock in terms of structures, on the one hand, and equipment and intangibles, on the 
other, to the one that prevailed in the year 2009.
8
 Henceforth this index of the capital stock will 
be referred to as
1
tK . 
Figure 3 displays the evolution over time of the average service lives of structures, equipment, 
intangibles and overall capital stock since 1947 at historical replacement prices. Observe that for 
all three assets, as well as for the overall capital stock, service lives declined through the early 
1980s, but ever since they have been rising. Apparently, while the capital stock in the U.S. non-
farm private business sector was getting younger and thus embodied technological advances at a 
quicker pace in the first period, in the second period this trend reversed. Is this development unre-
lated to the decline in the U.S. economic growth in recent decades? Quite likely it is not because 
irrespective of the systemic forces that may have been responsible for the ageing of the capital 
stock, from theory it would expected and, as noted earlier, research has confirmed, that its contri-
bution to economic growth has decelerated. But how strong headwinds may emanate for potential 
output from this source is an issue that can be highlighted only on empirical grounds. To this ef-
fect, using the time series of service lives of the overall capital stock an index based on its 2009 
                                                     
8
 The only reason for choosing 2009 as the base year for constructing this and the other indices mentioned below is 
that it coincides with the most recent base year employed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
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value was derived and employed to adjust the index of the capital stock computed from equations 
(4)-(6). The result is a new series, referred henceforth as
2
tK , which reflects the changes in the 
average service lives of the producer’s goods in the sector under consideration. 
Next, let us turn to the changes in the relative prices of producer’s to consumer’s goods. Pay-
ing attention to this aspect is necessary because of the possibility that relative prices may affect 
the composition of the capital stock, which in turn may influence the productivity of capital and 
thereby the rate of economic growth. Relevant to this aspect is Figure 4. Observe that since the 
1960s structures became continuously more expensive relative to equipment and intangibles. In 
Bitros, Nadiri (2017a) we found that the elasticities of investment with respect to the relative 
prices coincide with the additive inverse of the elasticities of substitution of capital for labor at 
both the disaggregate and aggregate levels. For example, for structures we found that a 10% 
increase in their prices relative to consumer’s goods would lead to a 6% decline of investment 
in this asset, whereas an equiproportional decline in the prices of equipment and overall capital 
stock relative to consumer’s goods would reduce investment in these assets by 4.5 and 8.3 per-
cent, respectively. That is, as the quantity of structures declined and those of equipment and 
intangibles increased (see Figure 2), the composition of the capital stock tilted against the for-
mer and in favor of latter, particularly from the early 1980s when with the advent of globaliza-
tion it became increasingly beneficial for business firms to outsource the construction of ma-
chinery and intangibles from third countries. As a result, these developments may have ren-
12 
 
dered the composition of capital stock increasingly unbalanced, thereby leading to a decelera-
tion of overall investment and a slowdown in the productivity of capital. To account for the 
possible effects of this development, an index from the relative prices of the overall capital 
stock was constructed on the basis of its 2009 value and was employed to adjust the computed 
index of the capital stock series from equations (4)-(7). For reference and comparison this se-
ries will be referred henceforth as
3
tK . 
 The indices
1 2 3,   and t t tK K K  represent alternative measures of the capital input. Table A4 
displays their series along with the indices of ˆ  and t tK K , all lagged one period and based in the 
year 2009. The latter index coincides with the one reported by CBO, whereas the former was 
obtained by adjusting tK , as computed by applying equations (4)-(7) and shown in Table A3, 
Column 12, for changes in: (a) the composition of the capital stock in terms of structures, 
equipment and intangibles, (b) the average service lives of these producer’s goods , and (c) their 
prices relative to consumer’s goods. Moreover, to get an idea of how these alternative measures 
of the capital input evolved in the postwar period, Figure 5 brings them all together in a uni-
form setting. With these data in hand, it is possible now to appraise the contribution of capital 
input to the potential output. 
13 
 
4. Comparative analyses, results and interpretations 
The tasks in this section are threefold. The first is to compare the two measures of the capital in-
put, i.e. CBO’s
1 1
ˆ and ours t tK K  , to identify any significant differences among them, and to as-
sess their implications for potential output. The second task is to compute the percentage rate of 
change of the potential output ˆ% ptQ  using the capital input 1
ˆ
tK   and compare it with
1%  which is based on t
p
tQ K  . The expectation being that this comparison will enable us to get a 
glimpse of the differential influence that
1 1
ˆ and t tK K   exert on the potential output. Lastly, in or-
der to highlight the effects of the above changes in the capital stock on the potential output, the 
second task is repeated using separately each of the 
1 2 3
1 1 1,   and t t tK K K   measures of the capital 
input from Table A4. In all these efforts  and t tQ L from Table A1 and , , and 
p P p
t t tQ L A   from Table 
A2 will be considered as given  
4.1 Capital input related biases of potential output   
From equation (3) it follows that CBO researchers reckon the contribution of the capital input to 
the growth rate of the potential output at .3 times its percentage rate of change. Hence, the first 
aspect of interest is to compare the differences in the contributions of the capital input by looking 
at its measurements
1 1
ˆ and  t tK K  . Relevant to this comparison is Figure 6 in which the line 
14 
 
labeled ˆ% tK
′  depicts our measurement of the capital input, whereas the line labeled % tK
′
shows the capital input as measured by CBO. Observe certain key similarities and differ-
ences. But before turning to their assessment, it is pertinent to note that the series 
1 1
ˆ%  and %t tK K  
′ ′ were obtained by passing the variables 
1 1
ˆ.3 %  and .3 %t tK K    through a 
ten year centered moving average smoothing filter. The rational for adopting this procedure being 
to eliminate medium run variations in the capital stock due to reasons other than the above men-
tioned systematic long run changes in its composition, average service lives and the declining pric-
es of producer’s relative to consumer’s goods. As for the upper and lower straight lines, these dis-
play the trends that were computed for 
1 1
ˆ%  and %t tK K  
′ ′  with the help of the equations shown.
9
 
    Looking at this figure a key feature worth stressing is how the 1%
'
tK   line runs relative to that 
of
1
ˆ% 'tK  . It gives rise to three implications. The first springs from the observation that from 
1949 to 2016 the line of 
1
ˆ% 'tK   remains above that of 1%
'
tK  . Surprisingly they never cross. 
Consequently, CBO’s measure of the capital input underestimates consistently its contribution to 
potential output. The second implication is that the order of the underestimation is very signifi-
                                                     
9
 The coefficients in both equations in Figures 6 and 7 are statistically significant with comfortable levels of confidence 
and the coefficients of determination explain about 25% of the variance in the respective dependent variables.   
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cant. In particular, if computed at the mean values of
1 1
ˆ%  and %t tK K  
′ ′ , CBO’s measure of the 
capital input underestimates its contribution to potential output by as much as 74.1% (See last 
row in Table A5 in the Appendix). Lastly, the third implication is that by both measures of the 
capital input the trend of their contribution to potential output has been declining throughout. 
This is consistent with the available evidence from the studies mentioned in the introduction, as 
well as from the literature in this area in general. 
In view of the above, one would be justified to suspect that CBO’s measurement of the capital 
input overestimates potential TFP. So let us find out by applying the following steps: (a) using 
equation (2) in conjunction with 1% , %  and %t t tQ L K     from Table 1, Columns 1, 2 , 3,  we 
compute % tTFP ;  (b) repeating the last step but using instead 1
ˆ% tK  from Table A3, Column 
13, gives us ˆ% tTFP ;  and (c) subjecting  
ˆ%  and %t tTFP TFP   to a ten year centered moving 
average smoothing filter, yields ˆ%  and %' 't tTFP TFP  . Figure 7 juxtaposes these series to 
gauge the direction and magnitude of possible bias.  Observe that CBO’s measure of the capital 
input does indeed overestimate its contribution to potential TFP. In particular, if calculated at 
the mean values of ˆ%  and %' 't tTFP TFP  , this overestimation amounts to 100.7% (See last row 
in Table A5 in the Appendix). 
The implications of these findings are straightforward. According to equation (3), the percent-
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age rate of change in the capital input is weighted by .3 while the percentage rate of change of 
potential TFP is weighted by 1. Hence, as the low weight assigned to an already underestimated 
capital input combines with the high weight assigned to an already overestimated total factor 
productivity, CBO’s measure of the capital input raises the percentage rate of change of potential 
output more than it would be warranted if the capital input was measured by allowing for the 
changes in the composition, service lives and relative prices of the assets in the capital stock. This 
happens at the same time that the trends in the contributions to potential output of both the capital 
input and TFP are declining (see Figures 6 and 7). From this analysis it follows that the decelera-
tion of potential output may be far more serious than that estimated by CBO because of the de-
celeration not so much in the contribution of the capital input but in TFP.  
4.2 New estimate of potential output versus that of CBO’s 
To highlight further this finding, %
p
tQ will be computed by applying equation (3) twice, once 
by using the measure of input 
1
ˆ% tK  and another by relying on 1% tK  . Moreover, these compu-
tations will be carried out without any smoothing of the two measures so as to keep in line with 
the practice by CBO.  
Figure 8 displays the path of the actual GDP from the U.S. nonfarm private business sector in 
the postwar period, along with the paths of potential output as calculated using the above distinct 
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measures of the capital input. Observe that: (a) according to both estimates, the potential output 
started to decelerate from the middle 1990s; (b) the path of potential output estimated by CBO 
runs consistently above the one estimated by us; (c) the divergence between the two paths is wid-
ening after 2009, and (d) whereas by CBO’s estimate of potential output the real economy adjust-
ed sluggishly after the 2007 financial crisis, by our estimate the economy adjusted fairly quickly 
to its lower potential output and in the last few years it has even exceeded it.  Recall at this point 
that the contribution to potential output from the potential labor input is the same in both estima-
tions. Hence, the reason why our estimate of potential output runs lower than CBO’s and the gap 
between the two estimates widens after 2009 should be due to the different rates by which the 
contributions of the capital input and TFP to potential output decline. Figures 6 and 7 show that, 
while the trend growth rates of both the capital input and the TFP are declining, with CBO’s 
measure of the capital input the trend growth rate of potential output decelerates slower (see 
ˆ and  linest tK K  in Figure 5 and 1%
'
tΔK   line in Figure 6) and TFP decelerates faster (see % tΔTFP  
line in Figure 7), thus pushing CBO’s path of potential output further above that of ours (see Figure 
8). Or, expressing this finding in a forward looking manner, if the capital input is measured proper-
ly, the outlook for economic growth in the coming years is even bleaker than glimpsed from CBO’s 
estimates of the potential output because, in addition to the headwinds mentioned in the introduc-
tion, both the capital input and TFP decelerate, and indeed the latter faster than the former.  
To summarize, irrespective of the issues of measurement, the long term trend in the contribu-
tion of the capital input to potential output, and hence to U.S. economic growth, is declining. This 
is a matter of grave importance because it points to headwinds that inhibit the acceleration of in-
vestment, the renewal of the capital stock, and the speedy introduction of new technologies that 
may invigorate TFP. How pervasive these headwinds may be was highlighted recently from the 
article by Bloomberg (2017). Even though U.S corporations are awash with trillions of dollars in 
cash, the interest rates are at record lows, and the effective tax rates are extremely competitive 
relative to other countries, from this article we learned that corporate executive would not be in-
centivised to boost investing by the reduction in the statutory tax rate which is discussed current-
ly in the Congress. Headwinds to investing may spring from the demand side, the uncertainty that 
emanates from the huge public and private debts, or even abrupt and unforeseen changes in insti-
tutions and policies. However, whatever the reasons may be, one thing is certain. The changes in 
18 
 
the structure of the capital stock and the reasons for the profound slowdown of the capital input 
are too important and they should be given the urgent attention they deserve.  
4.3 Capital input adjustments and potential output 
Regarding their effects on potential output, Figure 5 helps us classify capital input adjustments into 
two categories. One that includes the adjustments giving rise to profiles adjacent to ˆ
tK , and another 
that includes profiles closed to tK . Observe that the profiles of
1 3 and t tK K , which allow respective-
ly for changes in the composition of the capital stock and the relative prices of the underlying as-
sets, fall in the first category, whereas the profile of
2
tK , accounting for the changes in the average 
service lives of these assets, falls in the second. Focusing on the effects of the capital input adjust-
ments in the first category, the conclusions would differ from those reached earlier only in degree. 
In particular, the adjustments for compositional and relative price changes would influence the con-
tributions of the capital input to the potential output in a way that would push the latter’s  estimated 
profile further below that estimated by CBO. Therefore, the only case of interest remaining is to 
focus on the effects of
2
tK .  
Relevant to this case is Figure 9. Observe that throughout the period under consideration the 
path of estimated potential output us runs narrowly around that of CBO. Thus, by comparing the 
graphs in Figures 9 and 8 arise two implications. The first is that the said adjustment in the capi-
tal input gives an improved estimation of the potential output. For, while on the one hand it does 
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not result in systematic overestimation or underestimation relative to the estimate by CBO, on the 
other it captures the losses and gains in efficiency that are associated with the long cycles over 
which producer’s goods are getting older or younger, respectively. As for the second implication, 
this suggests that service life adjustments in the capital input influence the path of the estimated 
potential output in the opposite direction to that under the adjustments for changes in the compo-
sition and the relative prices of productive assets. To ascertain that this is case, notice from Fig-
ure 8 that, when all three adjustments are imposed, the path for potential output runs consistently 
below that by CBO and from the late 1990s it decelerates at an increasing rate. From these impli-
cations it follows that the changes in the capital input which are reflected in the indices 
1 2 3,   and t t tK K K  influence differently the estimates of potential output and that ignoring them may 
lead to significant errors of measurement, interpretations and recommended remedial policies.   
5. Summary of findings and conclusions 
Considered in the context of CBO’s pessimistic projections of the potential output, the long lag in 
the recovery of the U. S. economy from the 2007 financial crisis, stirred in 2013 a lot of heated 
debates regarding the future of U.S. economic growth. At the time some economists even inter-
preted this experience as a sign of alarm strong enough to hypothesize that the economy had en-
tered into a protracted period of secular stagnation. However, since then the economy has recov-
ered wonderfully, and this turnaround has encouraged some observers like Coy (2017) to feel jus-
tified in expressing the view that devoting resources to promote the Secular Stagnation Project 
and to organize high level conferences devoted to this agenda are unwarranted, if not wasteful.
10
      
The objective in this study was to contribute to the debate by looking into the possible linkag-
es between potential output and capital input, which has not received the attention it deserves. For 
this purpose the analytical framework of the U.S. Congressional Budget office was adapted and 
used in conjunction with data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis pertaining to nonfarm 
private business sector over the period 1947-2016. By focusing on the changes in the composi-
tion of the capital stock in terms of  structures, equipment and intangibles; average service lives; 
and the relative prices of producer’s to consumer’s goods, it became possible to allow for their 
influence on the capital input and trace the latter’s effects on potential output. In particular, it was 
                                                     
10
 For an explanation of the objectives of the Secular Stagnation Project and the related conference that was con-
vened in December 15, 2017, in New York, see Summers (2017).  
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found that: a) when the capital input is adjusted to reflect all aforementioned changes, potential 
output in recent decades decelerates even faster than CBO’s estimates; b) in the post-2007 period 
the gap between our estimate of potential output and that by CBO is widening, and (c) the acceler-
ated slowing down of potential output is due to the declining share of structures in the capital stock 
and the spectacular decline in prices of equipment relative to the prices of structures in terms of 
consumer’s goods. Drawing on these findings led to the conclusion that, although the real economy 
may have overshoot its potential in recent years, the forces that slow down potential output through 
the capital input remain intact and that, unless some remedial policies are instituted, they will con-
tinue to function as significant headwinds to U.S. economic growth, along with all others impedi-
ments mentioned in the introduction. 
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APPENDIX 
    Table A1: Actual data underlying CBO’s computations of potential GDP  
                                            in the U.S nonfarm private business sector 
Year t
GDP Q
(1)  
tL  
(2)  
1tK   
(3) 
Labor  
productivity 
(4)=(1):(2) 
 Year t
GDP Q
 (1) 
tL  
(2) 
1tK   
(3) 
Labor 
productivity 
(4)=(1):(2) 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1,309 
1,441 
1,548 
1,595 
1,675 
1,650 
1,790 
1,823 
1,860 
1,823 
1,975 
2,010 
2,053 
2,194 
2,295 
2,448 
2,624 
2,812 
2,865 
3,018 
3,110 
3,105 
3,222 
3,438 
3,687 
3,631 
3,571 
3,826 
4,044 
4,312 
4,455 
4,415 
4,517 
4,373 
4,657 
5,047 
5,262 
83.4 
80.1 
82.7 
86.6 
87.5 
89.7 
86.7 
90.1 
92.4 
91.8 
88.0 
92.0 
92.6 
91.6 
93.6 
94.6 
98.7 
103.0 
103.7 
106.0 
109.3 
107.9 
107.3 
111.3 
115.9 
116.2 
111.4 
115.6 
120.0 
126.0 
130.3 
129.5 
130.9 
128.1 
130.3 
138.1 
142.0 
11.8 
12.1 
12.6 
13.0 
13.5 
13.9 
14.3 
14.8 
15.3 
15.8 
16.2 
16.7 
17.2 
17.9 
18.5 
19.2 
20.0 
21.1 
22.3 
23.4 
24.5 
25.6 
26.7 
27.7 
29.0 
30.4 
31.6 
32.4 
33.3 
34.5 
35.9 
37.4 
38.9 
40.3 
41.6 
42.9 
44.8 
15.7 
16.2 
16.8 
17.4 
17.9 
18.2 
18.5 
18.8 
19.3 
19.8 
20.3 
20.8 
21.4 
22.0 
22.6 
23.2 
23.9 
24.8 
25.7 
26.5 
27.3 
28.0 
28.5 
28.9 
29.4 
29.9 
30.4 
30.8 
31.2 
31.7 
32.2 
32.3 
32.3 
32.7 
33.2 
33.7 
34.4 
 1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
5,463 
5,658 
5,916 
6,134 
6,228 
6,191 
6,442 
6,642 
6,950 
7,191 
7,516 
7,909 
8,325 
8,789 
9,173 
9,240 
9,404 
9,697 
10,131 
10,513 
10,848 
11,097 
10,954 
10,488 
10,823 
11,061 
11,406 
11,633 
12,015 
12,426 
12,611 
143.4 
148.0 
152.4 
157.2 
157.3 
154.3 
154.7 
158.8 
165.3 
169.6 
173.4 
179.2 
184.1 
188.1 
191.3 
188.4 
184.8 
183.2 
185.6 
188.9 
193.1 
195.1 
192.7 
180.2 
180.4 
184.8 
188.8 
192.5 
196.9 
201.3 
204.6 
46.6 
48.3 
49.9 
51.5 
53.2 
54.6 
55.8 
57.1 
58.7 
60.6 
62.9 
65.6 
68.8 
72.5 
76.5 
80.3 
83.2 
85.2 
87.1 
89.2 
91.7 
94.5 
97.3 
99.3 
100.0 
100.8 
102.2 
104.0 
105.9 
108.0 
110.3 
35.1 
35.8 
36.5 
37.3 
38.0 
38.6 
39.1 
39.6 
40.2 
40.7 
41.5 
42.6 
44.0 
45.5 
47.2 
48.8 
50.3 
51.5 
52.9 
54.1 
55.2 
56.2 
57.1 
57.9 
58.4 
58.9 
59.5 
60.2 
60.8 
61.6 
62.4 
Notes 
1. Actual GDP in billions of chained 2009 dollars. 
2. Actual hours worked, billions of hours. Data from 1964 to 2016 from U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Division 
of Major Sector Productivity, August 18, 2017. Data for 1949 to 1963, computed backwards using the percentages of 
annual change from BLS series PRS85006032. 
3. Capital Services, index: 2009 = 100, lagged one year. 
Source: CBO's June 2017 report: An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017 to 2027, 
www.cbo.gov/publication/52801 
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Table A2: Historical and projected potential values of GDP and its 
                                        determinants in the U.S nonfarm private business sector 
 
Year 
P p
t tGDP Q
(1)  
P
tL  
(2)  
1
p
tK   
(3) 
P
tA   
(4) 
 Year 
P
tGDP  
(1) 
P
tL  
(2) 
1
p
tK   
(3) 
P
tA  
(4) 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1,341 
1,412 
1,481 
1,558 
1,629 
1,680 
1,722 
1,768 
1,823 
1,891 
1,962 
2,041 
2,123 
2,210 
2,309 
2,412 
2,520 
2,637 
2,769 
2,906 
3,041 
3,160 
3,271 
3,387 
3,508 
3,653 
3,806 
3,945 
4,086 
4,241 
4,399 
4,516 
4,620 
4,773 
4,944 
5,129 
5,336 
5,548 
5,753 
5,949 
85.5 
87.2 
88.1 
89.3 
91.1 
92.3 
93.1 
93.9 
94.7 
95.6 
96.8 
98.1 
99.3 
100.5 
102.2 
103.9 
105.3 
106.5 
107.8 
109.5 
111.2 
112.9 
114.9 
117.3 
119.4 
122.0 
125.0 
128.0 
130.9 
133.7 
136.6 
139.8 
143.0 
146.1 
149.1 
152.2 
155.2 
158.0 
160.7 
162.9 
11.8 
12.1 
12.6 
13.0 
13.5 
13.9 
14.3 
14.8 
15.3 
15.8 
16.2 
16.7 
17.2 
17.9 
18.5 
19.2 
20.0 
21.1 
22.3 
23.4 
24.5 
25.6 
26.7 
27.7 
29.0 
30.4 
31.6 
32.4 
33.3 
34.5 
35.9 
37.4 
38.9 
40.3 
41.6 
42.9 
44.8 
46.6 
48.3 
49.9 
46.4 
47.8 
49.1 
50.5 
51.5 
52.1 
52.6 
53.1 
53.8 
54.9 
56.1 
57.4 
58.6 
59.9 
61.2 
62.5 
63.8 
65.2 
66.6 
68.1 
69.4 
70.3 
70.9 
71.6 
72.3 
73.2 
74.2 
75.2 
76.3 
77.3 
78.2 
78.1 
77.8 
78.4 
79.4 
80.5 
81.5 
82.6 
83.7 
84.8 
 1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
2017 
2018 
2019 
2020 
2021 
2022 
2023 
2024 
2025 
2026 
2027 
6,142 
6,332 
6,508 
6,680 
6,869 
7,080 
7,313 
7,564 
7,871 
8,242 
8,639 
9,035 
9,415 
9,737 
10,015 
10,290 
10,569 
10,809 
11,016 
11,226 
11,405 
11,525 
11,657 
11,829 
12,033 
12,257 
12,492 
12,719 
12,943 
13,191 
13,459 
13,740 
14,033 
14,339 
14,655 
14,977 
15,306 
15,642 
15,986 
164.7 
166.5 
168.4 
170.7 
173.4 
176.3 
179.6 
182.4 
184.9 
187.4 
189.7 
191.3 
192.8 
193.8 
194.3 
194.7 
195.2 
195.7 
196.0 
196.5 
197.1 
197.4 
197.9 
198.8 
200.0 
201.4 
202.9 
203.9 
204.6 
205.4 
206.2 
207.0 
207.8 
208.6 
209.5 
210.4 
211.3 
212.2 
213.0 
51.5 
53.2 
54.6 
55.8 
57.1 
58.7 
60.6 
62.9 
65.6 
68.8 
72.5 
76.5 
80.3 
83.2 
85.2 
87.1 
89.2 
91.7 
94.5 
97.3 
99.3 
100.0 
100.8 
102.2 
104.0 
105.9 
108.0 
110.3 
112.6 
115.0 
117.7 
120.4 
123.0 
125.6 
128.3 
130.9 
133.7 
136.5 
139.4 
85.9 
86.9 
87.8 
88.7 
89.5 
90.4 
91.3 
92.3 
93.9 
95.8 
97.9 
100.0 
102.0 
103.9 
105.9 
107.9 
109.8 
111.1 
111.9 
112.7 
113.5 
114.3 
115.1 
115.9 
116.7 
117.5 
118.3 
119.2 
120.1 
121.1 
122.3 
123.5 
124.9 
126.3 
127.8 
129.3 
130.9 
132.4 
134.0 
Notes 
1. Potential GDP in billions of chained 2009 dollars. 
2. Potential hours worked in billions of hours.  
3. Cyclically unadjusted capital Services, index: 2009 = 100, lagged one year. Hence, 1 1
P
t tK K  . 
4. Potential Total Factor Productivity, index: 2000 = 100 
Source: CBO's June 2017 report: An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017 to 2027,  
www.cbo.gov/publication/52801 
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    Table A3: Actual data underlying CBO’s computations of capital input  
                                               in the U.S nonfarm private business sector 
 
Year S t
K  
(1)  
EtK  
(2)  
I tK  
(3) 
tK  
(4) 
S tc  
(5)  
E tc  
(6)  
I tc  
(7) 
tc  
(8) 
St   
(9) 
Et  
(10) 
It  
(11) 
tK  
(12) 
ˆ
tK  
(13) 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1.484 
1.490 
1.492 
1.503 
1.523 
1.541 
1.570 
1.603 
1.645 
1.702 
1.754 
1.790 
1.827 
1.878 
1.926 
1.980 
2.031 
2.101 
2.204 
2.317 
2.413 
2.506 
2.607 
2.699 
2.779 
2.862 
2.964 
3.049 
3.092 
3.138 
3.193 
3.290 
3.426 
3.574 
3.745 
3.894 
3.980 
4.116 
4.274 
4.363 
4.432 
4.497 
4.566 
4.635 
4.648 
4.635 
0.486 
0.454 
0.422 
0.399 
0.381 
0.365 
0.356 
0.345 
0.343 
0.343 
0.344 
0.337 
0.336 
0.338 
0.339 
0.346 
0.356 
0.373 
0.402 
0.439 
0.470 
0.501 
0.537 
0.564 
0.588 
0.623 
0.676 
0.724 
0.747 
0.775 
0.822 
0.888 
0.960 
1.010 
1.059 
1.087 
1.119 
1.187 
1.258 
1.320 
1.373 
1.435 
1.502 
1.552 
1.579 
1.619 
0.033 
0.034 
0.034 
0.035 
0.036 
0.038 
0.043 
0.047 
0.051 
0.057 
0.062 
0.067 
0.072 
0.077 
0.084 
0.090 
0.097 
0.104 
0.113 
0.124 
0.136 
0.148 
0.160 
0.168 
0.175 
0.183 
0.192 
0.201 
0.207 
0.218 
0.231 
0.245 
0.264 
0.282 
0.305 
0.328 
0.353 
0.387 
0.422 
0.459 
0.491 
0.526 
0.571 
0.620 
0.668 
0.717 
2.027 
2.061 
2.076 
2.097 
2.120 
2.133 
2.159 
2.181 
2.217 
2.265 
2.304 
2.320 
2.343 
2.383 
2.423 
2.474 
2.529 
2.607 
2.728 
2.867 
2.981 
3.092 
3.210 
3.312 
3.394 
3.494 
3.625 
3.726 
3.758 
3.801 
3.866 
3.987 
4.141 
4.275 
4.413 
4.515 
4.567 
4.726 
4.908 
5.030 
5.150 
5.294 
5.460 
5.628 
5.742 
5.866 
0.051 
0.057 
0.057 
0.065 
0.084 
0.083 
0.087 
0.079 
0.081 
0.089 
0.099 
0.097 
0.100 
0.100 
0.099 
0.095 
0.094 
0.092 
0.091 
0.099 
0.103 
0.115 
0.125 
0.136 
0.133 
0.131 
0.132 
0.146 
0.159 
0.152 
0.150 
0.157 
0.172 
0.200 
0.233 
0.235 
0.204 
0.209 
0.198 
0.194 
0.190 
0.182 
0.173 
0.174 
0.159 
0.149 
0.623 
0.686 
0.736 
0.839 
1.011 
0.961 
0.960 
0.882 
0.876 
0.905 
0.953 
0.934 
0.943 
0.928 
0.894 
0.843 
0.826 
0.796 
0.785 
0.809 
0.833 
0.876 
0.912 
0.916 
0.861 
0.804 
0.771 
0.785 
0.846 
0.828 
0.804 
0.815 
0.835 
0.895 
0.920 
0.859 
0.749 
0.737 
0.660 
0.588 
0.566 
0.547 
0.491 
0.483 
0.458 
0.428 
0.535 
0.527 
0.522 
0.585 
0.670 
0.645 
0.682 
0.643 
0.647 
0.662 
0.694 
0.698 
0.715 
0.717 
0.712 
0.688 
0.680 
0.665 
0.638 
0.664 
0.681 
0.720 
0.761 
0.760 
0.722 
0.686 
0.666 
0.673 
0.697 
0.684 
0.651 
0.651 
0.658 
0.713 
0.746 
0.739 
0.703 
0.734 
0.700 
0.692 
0.658 
0.633 
0.598 
0.568 
0.541 
0.515 
0.197 
0.213 
0.224 
0.258 
0.323 
0.318 
0.333 
0.309 
0.313 
0.336 
0.368 
0.364 
0.379 
0.379 
0.371 
0.358 
0.352 
0.342 
0.336 
0.354 
0.366 
0.397 
0.425 
0.444 
0.424 
0.402 
0.395 
0.417 
0.455 
0.441 
0.431 
0.439 
0.460 
0.521 
0.575 
0.558 
0.499 
0.503 
0.474 
0.456 
0.436 
0.413 
0.387 
0.381 
0.351 
0.325 
0.488 
0.461 
0.444 
0.450 
0.447 
0.445 
0.432 
0.430 
0.434 
0.438 
0.433 
0.430 
0.427 
0.424 
0.419 
0.412 
0.403 
0.392 
0.390 
0.381 
0.383 
0.383 
0.396 
0.399 
0.402 
0.403 
0.413 
0.412 
0.398 
0.391 
0.389 
0.395 
0.410 
0.437 
0.453 
0.443 
0.442 
0.447 
0.456 
0.455 
0.446 
0.447 
0.447 
0.431 
0.419 
0.414 
0.488 
0.461 
0.444 
0.450 
0.447 
0.445 
0.432 
0.430 
0.434 
0.438 
0.433 
0.430 
0.427 
0.424 
0.419 
0.412 
0.403 
0.392 
0.390 
0.381 
0.383 
0.383 
0.396 
0.399 
0.402 
0.403 
0.413 
0.412 
0.398 
0.391 
0.389 
0.395 
0.410 
0.437 
0.453 
0.443 
0.442 
0.447 
0.456 
0.455 
0.446 
0.447 
0.447 
0.431 
0.419 
0.414 
0.085 
0.080 
0.079 
0.072 
0.074 
0.080 
0.087 
0.090 
0.091 
0.092 
0.099 
0.103 
0.108 
0.116 
0.121 
0.126 
0.130 
0.130 
0.131 
0.135 
0.136 
0.138 
0.135 
0.136 
0.137 
0.135 
0.130 
0.126 
0.131 
0.129 
0.125 
0.121 
0.119 
0.116 
0.120 
0.133 
0.141 
0.148 
0.159 
0.160 
0.163 
0.172 
0.172 
0.183 
0.194 
0.199 
2.78 
2.83 
2.90 
2.97 
3.03 
3.13 
3.20 
3.30 
3.43 
3.55 
3.61 
3.69 
3.79 
3.88 
4.00 
4.13 
4.29 
4.51 
4.77 
4.98 
5.20 
5.44 
5.62 
5.79 
6.01 
6.29 
6.56 
6.71 
6.90 
7.15 
7.49 
7.89 
8.27 
8.69 
9.07 
9.43 
9.99 
10.60 
11.13 
11.62 
12.13 
12.68 
13.20 
13.60 
14.01 
14.52 
10.2 
10.4 
10.6 
10.9 
11.1 
11.5 
11.7 
12.1 
12.6 
13.0 
13.2 
13.5 
13.9 
14.3 
14.7 
15.2 
15.8 
16.6 
17.5 
18.3 
19.1 
20.0 
20.7 
21.3 
22.1 
23.1 
24.1 
24.6 
25.3 
26.3 
27.5 
29.0 
30.4 
31.9 
33.3 
34.6 
36.7 
38.9 
40.9 
42.7 
44.5 
46.6 
48.5 
49.9 
51.4 
53.3 
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1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
4.622 
4.617 
4.637 
4.679 
4.750 
4.838 
4.920 
5.033 
5.128 
5.123 
5.101 
5.079 
5.067 
5.085 
5.160 
5.259 
5.248 
5.166 
5.100 
5.087 
5.081 
5.120 
5.135 
1.691 
1.792 
1.923 
2.073 
2.250 
2.466 
2.720 
2.996 
3.196 
3.324 
3.452 
3.611 
3.815 
4.053 
4.280 
4.407 
4.321 
4.352 
4.478 
4.676 
4.883 
5.110 
5.335 
0.763 
0.806 
0.856 
0.921 
1.007 
1.105 
1.222 
1.345 
1.439 
1.508 
1.576 
1.650 
1.735 
1.822 
1.913 
1.997 
2.052 
2.104 
2.164 
2.231 
2.302 
2.379 
2.469 
6.030 
6.241 
6.512 
6.839 
7.244 
7.722 
8.254 
8.840 
9.326 
9.647 
9.978 
10.356 
10.811 
11.332 
11.883 
12.351 
12.514 
12.733 
13.073 
13.554 
14.066 
14.643 
15.202 
0.142 
0.145 
0.141 
0.139 
0.134 
0.132 
0.137 
0.146 
0.147 
0.150 
0.143 
0.146 
0.153 
0.168 
0.173 
0.192 
0.179 
0.161 
0.156 
0.147 
0.148 
0.147 
0.149 
0.395 
0.406 
0.392 
0.377 
0.355 
0.328 
0.327 
0.330 
0.320 
0.316 
0.286 
0.275 
0.262 
0.258 
0.251 
0.259 
0.246 
0.224 
0.216 
0.208 
0.207 
0.205 
0.208 
0.483 
0.469 
0.460 
0.449 
0.433 
0.428 
0.432 
0.456 
0.430 
0.413 
0.385 
0.374 
0.351 
0.349 
0.344 
0.357 
0.341 
0.318 
0.312 
0.299 
0.290 
0.285 
0.286 
0.303 
0.304 
0.289 
0.277 
0.260 
0.240 
0.240 
0.248 
0.240 
0.235 
0.216 
0.210 
0.200 
0.202 
0.201 
0.215 
0.204 
0.184 
0.178 
0.166 
0.164 
0.161 
0.163 
0.404 
0.391 
0.381 
0.371 
0.365 
0.357 
0.352 
0.355 
0.356 
0.358 
0.360 
0.371 
0.386 
0.389 
0.402 
0.397 
0.384 
0.376 
0.363 
0.360 
0.355 
0.348 
0.342 
0.404 
0.391 
0.381 
0.371 
0.365 
0.357 
0.352 
0.355 
0.356 
0.358 
0.360 
0.371 
0.386 
0.389 
0.402 
0.397 
0.384 
0.376 
0.363 
0.360 
0.355 
0.348 
0.342 
0.194 
0.200 
0.205 
0.213 
0.225 
0.231 
0.240 
0.236 
0.234 
0.240 
0.242 
0.236 
0.230 
0.230 
0.228 
0.237 
0.248 
0.254 
0.258 
0.255 
0.255 
0.256 
0.261 
15.11 
15.81 
16.62 
17.51 
18.51 
19.65 
20.83 
21.71 
22.24 
22.76 
23.42 
24.25 
25.22 
26.25 
27.09 
27.23 
27.60 
28.18 
28.92 
29.68 
30.59 
31.49 
32.30 
55.5 
58.0 
61.0 
64.3 
68.0 
72.2 
76.5 
79.7 
81.7 
83.6 
86.0 
89.1 
92.6 
96.4 
99.5 
100.0 
101.3 
103.5 
106.2 
109.0 
112.3 
115.7 
118.6 
Notes 
1. Capital stock in structures chained 2009 dollars. 
2. Actual hours worked, billions of hours. Data from 1964 to 2016 from U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), Division 
of Major Sector Productivity, August 18, 2017. Data for 1949 to 1963, computed backwards using the percentages of 
annual change from BLS series PRS85006032. 
3. Capital Services, index: 2009 = 100, lagged one year. 
Source 
CBO's June 2017 report: An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017 to 2027, www.cbo.gov/publication/52801 
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Table A4: Alternative indices of the capital input in the  
    U.S nonfarm private business sector
1,2
 
 
Year 
1
1tK 
(1) 
  
2
1tK 
(2) 
3
1tK 
(3) 
1
ˆ
tK 
 (4) 
1tK 
(5) 
 
 
Year 
1
1tK    
(1) 
2
1tK   
(2)  
3
1tK   
(3) 
1
ˆ
tK    
 (4) 
1tK   
(5)  
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
4.9 
4.9 
5.1 
5.2 
5.4 
5.5 
5.7 
5.9 
6.2 
6.4 
6.5 
6.7 
6.9 
7.2 
7.4 
7.7 
8.1 
8.6 
9.2 
9.7 
10.2 
10.8 
11.2 
11.6 
12.2 
12.9 
13.6 
13.9 
14.4 
15.1 
16.0 
17.0 
17.8 
18.8 
19.7 
20.6 
22.1 
6.6 
7.0 
7.5 
8.0 
8.5 
9.1 
9.5 
10.0 
10.7 
11.4 
11.6 
12.0 
12.3 
12.6 
13.1 
13.5 
14.2 
15.3 
16.5 
17.5 
18.4 
19.7 
20.4 
21.3 
22.1 
23.7 
25.3 
26.2 
27.3 
29.0 
31.2 
34.3 
37.0 
40.6 
42.4 
44.1 
46.7 
6.7 
6.7 
6.8 
6.8 
6.9 
7.2 
7.3 
7.5 
7.4 
7.5 
7.7 
7.9 
8.2 
8.5 
8.9 
9.3 
9.7 
10.3 
11.0 
11.5 
12.0 
12.6 
13.0 
13.3 
13.8 
14.7 
15.4 
15.1 
15.5 
16.0 
16.9 
17.9 
19.1 
19.9 
20.8 
22.6 
24.7 
2.1 
2.1 
2.3 
2.4 
2.5 
2.7 
2.9 
3.0 
3.1 
3.2 
3.3 
3.5 
3.6 
3.8 
4.0 
4.2 
4.5 
4.9 
5.4 
5.8 
6.2 
6.7 
7.0 
7.3 
7.6 
8.4 
9.1 
9.0 
9.5 
10.2 
11.1 
12.4 
13.6 
15.0 
15.6 
17.1 
19.0 
11.8 
12.1 
12.6 
13.0 
13.5 
13.9 
14.3 
14.8 
15.3 
15.8 
16.2 
16.7 
17.2 
17.9 
18.5 
19.2 
20.0 
21.1 
22.3 
23.4 
24.5 
25.6 
26.7 
27.7 
29.0 
30.4 
31.6 
32.4 
33.3 
34.5 
35.9 
37.4 
38.9 
40.3 
41.6 
42.9 
44.8 
 1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
2012 
2013 
2014 
2015 
2016 
23.7 
25.2 
26.7 
28.3 
30.1 
31.7 
33.1 
34.8 
36.9 
39.4 
42.3 
45.6 
49.4 
53.7 
59.1 
64.5 
68.5 
71.5 
74.9 
79.0 
84.3 
90.3 
95.8 
99.5 
100.0 
103.4 
108.2 
113.6 
118.9 
124.4 
130.3 
50.3 
52.0 
52.7 
54.2 
56.7 
58.2 
58.3 
58.4 
59.7 
61.3 
64.2 
67.4 
71.1 
75.1 
79.7 
85.7 
88.1 
87.9 
87.8 
89.2 
91.2 
94.9 
100.0 
103.2 
100.0 
99.0 
102.3 
105.0 
107.8 
112.3 
115.7 
26.9 
28.4 
30.2 
31.9 
34.0 
36.2 
37.8 
40.1 
42.5 
44.8 
47.4 
51.2 
55.2 
59.7 
64.9 
70.2 
74.7 
77.9 
81.5 
84.7 
87.6 
90.9 
95.0 
99.2 
100.0 
104.0 
107.2 
110.3 
113.8 
117.4 
120.5 
21.2 
22.3 
23.3 
24.7 
26.7 
28.4 
29.2 
30.8 
32.9 
35.2 
38.2 
42.3 
46.9 
52.2 
58.7 
66.3 
71.0 
73.5 
76.6 
80.7 
85.0 
90.7 
97.9 
102.9 
100.0 
103.6 
110.8 
116.6 
122.7 
130.0 
135.8 
46.6 
48.3 
49.9 
51.5 
53.2 
54.6 
55.8 
57.1 
58.7 
60.6 
62.9 
65.6 
68.8 
72.5 
76.5 
80.3 
83.2 
85.2 
87.1 
89.2 
91.7 
94.5 
97.3 
99.3 
100.0 
100.8 
102.2 
104.0 
105.9 
108.0 
110.3 
Notes 
1. Capital Services, index: 2009 = 100, lagged one year. 
2. Series 1
r
tK  comes from Table A2, Column 3. 
Source: All underlying data for the figures in Columns 1-4 come from the National Income and Product 
Accounts published by the U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis. The figures in Column 5 come 
from Table 3, Column 2, in the Appendix.   
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 Table A5: CBO’s and author’s estimates of the sources of economic growth in the potential  
        output of  U.S. nonfarm private business sector over the period 1950-2016 
 
CBO’s estimates   Author’s estimates   
Years 
 & 
Periods 
% ptL  
 
1% tK   %
p
tTFP  %
p
tGDP  
 % ptL  1
ˆ% tK   
ˆ% ptTFP  
ˆ% ptGDP  
1950-1059 .0088 
 
.0097 .0218 .0402  .0088 .0190 .0196 .0474 
1960-1969 .0098 .0127 .0231 .0455  .0098 .0182 .0131 .0410 
1970-1979 .0146 .0117 .0118 .0380  .0146 ..0202 .0043 .0391 
1980-1989 .0008 .0110 .0091 .0209  .0008 .0199 -.0004 .0203 
1990-1999 .0100 .0105 .0132 .0336  .0100 .0169 .0071 .0339 
2000-2009 .0027 .0096 .0137 .0260  .0027 .0045 .0032 .0108 
2010-2016 .0034 .0045 .0074 .0153  .0034 .0105 .0034 .0173 
1950-1979 .0110 .0113 .0189 .0413  .0110 .0191 .0123 .0425 
1980-2016 .0076 .0093 .0111 .0280  .0076 .0167 .0033 .0277 
1950-2016 .0092 .0102 .0146 .0339  .0092 .0178 .0074 0.0343 
 
